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A B S T R A C T
This paper assesses the forces working for and against the political sustainability of the UK 2008 Climate
Change Act. The adoption of the Act is seen as a landmark commitment to action on climate change, but
its implementation has not been studied in any depth. Recent events, including disagreements over the
fourth carbon budget and the decarbonisation of the electricity sector, shows that while the Act might
appear to lock in a commitment to reducing emissions through legal means, this does not guarantee
political lock-in. The assumption, made by some proponents of the Act, that accountability of political
leaders to a public concerned about climate change, via Parliament, would provide the main political
underpinning to the Act is criticised. An analysis of alternative sources of political durability is presented,
drawing on a framework for understanding the sustainability of reform developed by Patashnik. It is
argued that the Act has helped create major institutional transformations, although the degree to which
new institutions have displaced the power of existing ones is limited. The Act has produced some policy
feedback effects, especially in the business community, and some limited investment effects, but both
have been insufﬁcient to withstand destabilisation by recent party political conﬂicts. The Climate
Change Act remains at risk.
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At the end of November 2008, the UK Parliament passed the
world’s ﬁrst Climate Change Act (henceforth ‘the Act’) setting a
legally binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of an
80% cut from 1990 levels by 2050. The Act has come to play a
central role in the UK’s image as a leader on climate change (e.g.
Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2010: 50–52). During its passage through
Parliament the legislation was widely seen as an historic step. It
enjoyed broad political support, was hailed by political leaders and
the media as ‘revolutionary’ (e.g. Tempest, 2007) and was
welcomed by environmentalists, trades unions and business.
The central pillar of the Act was the 2050 target, achieved through
a series of ﬁve yearly carbon budgets, recommendations for which
were to be made by a new independent expert Committee on Climate
Change. It also required the Government to put forward ‘‘policies and
proposals’’ sufﬁcient to ensure that carbon budgets were met. The
Act was intended as a means to bind future governments into
meeting emissions budgets on the route to the 2050 target. This* Tel.: +44 (0)1326 253786; fax: +44 01326 371859.
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Open access under CC BYconstraint on politicians was in turn aimed at giving conﬁdence to
investors in low carbon technologies and infrastructure, ‘‘safe in the
knowledge that governments would sustain the battle against
climate change over the medium to long term’’ (Friends of the Earth,
n.d.). However, less than four years after it was passed into law, there
are signs that the Act has not so far succeeded in securing either
political commitment or investor conﬁdence.
Implementation initially went smoothly. Recommendations
from the Committee for the ﬁrst three carbon budgets (up to 2022)
were agreed by the Government in 2009. A newly created
Department for Energy and Climate Change immediately set
about developing a Low Carbon Transition Plan to deliver these
budgets. The 2010 general election saw the formation of a coalition
Government which the new Prime Minister declared would be the
‘greenest government ever’.
However, signs of trouble emerged in the process of agreeing
the fourth carbon budget, which extended into the 2020s, beyond
any existing commitments by the European Union, and also had
important implications for upcoming investment decisions in the
power sector. In early 2011, the Business Secretary Vince Cable
intervened, arguing that the proposals for the fourth budget would
impose too many costs on the economy and could not be agreed as
they stood. After heavy lobbying by environmentalists, the Prime
Minister did eventually step in to insist that the Climate Change
Committee’s proposal be accepted, and the fourth budget was
ﬁnally agreed in May. However, the Chancellor, George Osborne,  license. 
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review of the fourth budget in 2014.
Further rifts were to come. In October 2011, the Chancellor
told the Conservative Party Conference that ‘‘a decade of
environmental laws and regulations are piling costs on the
energy bills of households and companies’’ and pledged to
prevent the UK from cutting emissions more quickly than other
European countries. In March 2012, the Government announced
a new emissions performance standard that would allow the
operation of gas-ﬁred power stations without carbon capture
until 2045 (DECC, 2012a). The chairman of the Climate Change
Committee warned that the standard jeopardised the feasibility
of future emissions reductions targets. In the summer, the
Chancellor wrote to the Energy Secretary demanding that
unabated gas should play a core role in electricity generation
to at least 2030, that the Government should not a set a 2030
target for electricity emissions, and that a cap be set on
decarbonisation policy costs ﬁnanced through energy bills. The
World Wildlife Fund accused the Government of allowing the
Act to ‘‘wither by neglect’’ (Allott, 2012). The Committee
chairman insisted that a target for electricity emissions was
needed to ‘‘buttress the signal provided by the carbon budgets’’,
but the published Energy Bill contained no decarbonisation
target, and an attempt led by rebels in the House of Commons in
the spring of 2013 to get one included failed.
Open conﬂict in government was alarming investors (Godsen,
2012). Seven global electricity technology ﬁrms wrote to the
Energy Secretary in September 2012 expressing concerns that the
UK was in danger of undermining its reputation as a country with
low political risk for energy investments. According to industry
sources, uncertainty had pushed up the cost of debt on energy
projects by 15% (Harper, 2012). By early 2013, a call for the Act
itself to be repealed appeared in a major national newspaper (The
Telegraph, 2013).
These events are a sharp reminder that ‘‘the passage of a reform
law is only the beginning of a political struggle’’ (Patashnik, 2008:
3). In the case of a major transformation such as that of
decarbonising an entire economy, this struggle may last several
decades. However, while some observers have noted the gap
between the ambition contained in the Act and the difﬁculties of
implementation (e.g. Helm, 2010; Giddens, 2009: 83–88), it
remains the case that most political analysis of climate policy
focuses on the adoption phase (for detailed accounts of the drivers
of the adoption of the Climate Change Act see Carter, 2006, 2010;
Carter and Ockwell, 2007; Hill, 2009; IoG, 2012; Rollinson, 2010).
By contrast, in this paper I examine the evolution of political
dynamics after climate policy is adopted. Of particular interest here
is the possibility that, once formally adopted, policy may
subsequently be undermined or even reversed in its implementa-
tion phase.
As the centrepiece of UK climate policy, underpinning more
detailed sectoral policies, the Climate Change Act is the main case
study. In examining the political dynamics of its implementation, I
draw on a framework for analysing the sustainability of public
interest reforms after adoption developed by Patashnik (2008),
applying it for the ﬁrst time both to climate change as a particularly
extreme kind of public interest or collective action problem, and to
the UK context.
The analysis offered here draws on interviews with two of the
original actors involved in the adoption of the Climate Change Act:
Bryony Worthington, who at Friends of the Earth provided the idea
of carbon budgets and went on to draft parts of the Act; and
Michael Jacobs, who was energy and environment adviser to the
Chancellor, and subsequently Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, from
2004 to 2010. It also draws on interviews with members of the
business community who preferred to remain anonymous.The next section lays out the theoretical approach. Section 3
considers the nature of climate change as a public interest policy
challenge. The view of some proponents of the Act was that it
would be politically underpinned by public concern about climate
change, expressed through accountability to Parliament. However,
I argue that this view is consistent neither with political theory nor
with evidence on the low salience of climate change in the UK. This
issue has been noted in passing (e.g. Carter, 2008, 2010; Lorenzoni
and Pidgeon, 2006; Hale, 2010; Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010) but
its political implications are rarely explored in any depth.
Patashnik’s framework suggests that public indifference means
that the durability of climate policy in the UK depends heavily on
the degree to which it has had other political lock-in effects.
Section 4 focuses on how far the transforming the institutional
landscape. Section 5 examines how far afﬁliations, interests and
identities in key political groups have been affected by the Act, and
Section 6 looks at how far the Act has led to the creation of new
vested interests through ﬁnancial and physical investments in the
electricity sector. The paper concludes with an overall assessment
of the risks of policy reversal, and an evaluation of the usefulness
and limitations of Patashnik’s approach.
2. Analytical approach
As noted above, while there is a growing literature on the
politics of climate change, there has been relatively little study of
the politics of implementation of climate policy. It has long been
recognised in political science that policy change is a process over
time, crucially including an implementation phase post-adoption
(Pierson, 2005; Hill, 2012). The early policy literature framed
implementation in terms of what is known in rational choice
theory as a ‘‘principal-agent problem’’, i.e. how policy makers can
get bureaucrats to implement policy in the spirit it was intended,
without being distorted or undermined by the interests of those
bureaucrats (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Subsequent
research (reviewed in Hill, 2012: 209–218) has opened up the
implementation process, recognising that policy continues to be
deﬁned during the process of implementation, and that imple-
mentation is just as much a contested and political process as
adoption.
Within this ﬁeld, of particular relevance for climate policy are
the political dynamics of policy reform undertaken in the wider
public interest or good. A long-standing theme in political science,
going back to Olsen (1965), is the expectation that special interest
groups are likely to drive political decision making more than the
public good, since such groups have lower costs to and greater
beneﬁts from getting their interests represented via organised
lobbies than do the general public. Despite this expectation, public
interest policies do get passed, and the Climate Change Act is an
example of just such a policy. However, public interest legislation
can also expect to face particular types of problem in the
implementation phase. Where there is a special interest group
pressing for a policy change, the implementation of that change
will beneﬁt from the continued support of that group. By contrast,
public interest reform typically involves the loss of beneﬁts by
previously privileged groups and at the same time, the beneﬁts for
the wider public may be widely diffused, and politically not very
visible. As we shall see below, this condition applies a fortiori to
climate policy.
The main analysis for the study of the political dynamics of
implementation of public interest policies comes from the work of
Patashnik (2003, 2008). His argument is that the sustainability of
such policy depends on the ‘‘reconﬁguration of political dynamics’’
(Patashnik, 2008: 3). To achieve this, policy change must ‘‘disrupt
longstanding patterns of governance, recast institutions, upset
existing power monopolies and create policy feedback effects that
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course. Reforms that do not accomplish these things, or do so only
superﬁcially, can be expected to unravel.’’ (Patashnik, 2008: 17).
Patashnik identiﬁed a number of changes that a policy must bring
about in order for it to be durable.
Institutional change cannot guarantee the success of a policy
reform, but a supportive institutional environment gives it a better
chance of enduring. Within Patashnik’s framework, such changes
can involve structural transformation that breaks up ‘‘cozy policy
subsystems’’ and strengthening governing capacities in the
relevant policy area (Patashnik, 2008: 26). However, policy
outcomes can rarely be locked in purely by new institutional
arrangements, since they are themselves the result of political
compromise, and if opposition to reform remains, they can be
reversed.
Thus even more important is the transformation of political
dynamics themselves. This transformation will come partly
through the destruction or neutralisation of the power of those
opposed to reform. As Patashnik notes (2008: 28), this process tends
to be more complete in situations where the power of economic
interest groups can be eroded through market processes. By
contrast, it is often hard to dislodge political opponents
completely. As discussed below, this is a particularly important
potential danger for climate policy. In such situations it becomes
crucial to achieve ‘policy feedback’ effects where a policy change
creates its own new constituency (Pierson, 1993; Mettler and Soss,
2004). The paradigmatic example is the creation of the welfare
state:
‘‘reforms were popular with the mass public, especially the
broadbased policies in the areas of pensions, education, and
health care. . . . The support for policies quickly broadened once
citizens enjoyed the beneﬁts of the new policies, and thus the
mass opposition to cutbacks in the policies was much broader
than the mass support for their introduction. Thus, the new
policy regime fundamentally transforms the preferences of the
population.’’ (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 29, emphasis in the
original)
In this case, feedback worked through creating new constitu-
encies, but it may also work through increasing or decreasing the
political cohesion of previously favoured sectors, or altering the
‘‘cognitive mindset’’ of existing groups, transforming their strate-
gies or preferences. If well framed, policy changes can also
transform the public image of politically important groups, for
example tarnishing the public image of a group previously held in
high esteem. Policy feedback can also work by inducing actors to
make commitments in the form of investments whose value is
conditional on the expectation that the reform will be maintained.
This literally creates new vested interests, and ‘‘suggests an
increasing returns process in which groups develop assets that are
speciﬁc to the new policy regime’’ (Patashnik, 2008: 31).
Where policy feedback transforms both group identities and
investments, change becomes ‘‘so deeply rooted in political
practice and culture over time that its dismantlement becomes
all but unthinkable’’ (Patashnik, 2008: 26–7). However, in practice,
many policy changes fail to build a constituency, a situation that
Patashnik (2008: 168) characterises as ‘‘winnerless reform’’. There
are, in addition, intermediate situations, where reform creates new
afﬁliations and identities but not new investments, or vice versa, in
which policy change remains incomplete and potentially vulnera-
ble to reversal (Patashnik, 2008: 32).
The current use of Patshnik’s framework in the case of the
Climate Change Act is, to my knowledge, not only its ﬁrst
application to climate policy, but also to any case outside of the
USA. I would argue that these extensions are apposite for two
reasons. First, the framework provides an analytical structure forexamining exactly the kind of problem that Patashnik’s framework
focuses on, i.e. the political dynamics of implementation of public
interest reform.
Second, while Patashnik developed his approach through a
number of case studies of American public interest legislation, its
key building blocks are applicable to other political and
institutional contexts (at least in liberal democracies), because
they relate to underlying and quite general political concepts. For
example, while the institutional factors relevant for the political
sustainability of the Climate Change Act will be quite different
from those relating to, say, US tax reform, it is nevertheless entirely
possible to identify such factors. The main general difference that
may apply between the dynamics of US and British policy reform is
that, with fewer separation of powers in the latter context, the
opportunities for opposition to reform that has been directed from
the centre (i.e. the Prime Minister) may be less. However, the
power of the centre can vary considerably over time, and many
such opportunities remain.
Finally, however, while Patashnik’s framework does help
structure the problem and identify key variables, the assessment
of how far and in what ways a policy change is sustainable is
ultimately a matter of judgement. There are thus degrees of
irreversibility, and very few policy changes are simply ‘untouch-
able’ as, say, the creation of the NHS in the post-war British context.
The quality of the judgement in turn depends on the nature of the
evidence and its degree of ambiguity.
As noted, the problem of securing politically sustainable policy
change in the case of public interest reform is particularly difﬁcult.
The nature of the difﬁculty arises from the nature of the underlying
policy problem. The ﬁrst step in analysing the case of the Climate
Change Act is therefore to examine the nature of climate change as
a public interest issue.
3. The nature of climate change as a public interest issue
Much public interest reform faces the problem that it is likely to
be opposed by special interests that will lose out, whilst at the
same time beneﬁts are widely diffused and politically invisible. In
this section I argue that climate policy represents a particularly
extreme example of this type of problem.
However, it is also the case that many of those involved in
pressing for and designing the Climate Change Act did not
believe that this was the case. Although the Climate Change Act
contains targets and budgets that are in principle legally
binding, it was actually conceived of as a way of ensuring long
term carbon emissions reduction through political mechanisms.
According to Hill (2009: 6): ‘‘The core philosophy of the Act is
[that a] built-in series of duties, actions and reports will create
the transparency, accountability and political pressure neces-
sary to achieve the purpose of the legislation’’. For those who
campaigned for it, key assumptions were that the principal
cause of the failure to meet emission reductions was a lack of
political will amongst leaders, and that public concern about
climate change, expressed via elected MPs in Parliament, would
play a critical role in holding future governments to account for
setting and delivering challenging carbon budgets. For example,
Tony Juniper, Director of Friends of the Earth and subsequently a
senior adviser on the Big Ask campaign, argued in November
2006:
‘‘So if it is not solutions we are short of, why is it that so many
responses express frustration at slow rate of progress to date?
Largely because so far the political will to seriously tackle this
problem just hasn’t been there. One reason for this is the view of
many in Government that there isn’t the ‘‘political space’’ to
attempt robust solutions. I think this debate shows that there
Fig. 2. Most important and other important issues facing Britain today.
Source: Ipsos MORI Issues Index (http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemID=56&view=wide).
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politicians who are lagging behind.’’ (Friends of the Earth, 2006)
Such views can also be found in the academic literature. For
example, Lorenzoni et al. (2008) argue that ‘‘there is a failure to
reﬂect emerging evidence of public concern about climate change
and calls for strong political leadership in national policy-making’’
(Lorenzoni et al., 2008: 113–114). They conclude that there is a
‘‘disjunction between the government’s weak positioning on
climate change and emerging public concern about climate
change’’ (Lorenzoni et al., 2008: 119).
It is true that, by the 2000s, polling evidence showed that a large
majority of the UK public accepted the existence of climate change
and expressed concern about it fairly consistently (Spence et al.,
2010; Anable et al., 2006; Downing and Ballantyne, 2007; DEFRA,
2010). In this sense, climate change in the UK had become what
Stokes (1963) termed a ‘valence’ issue, i.e. one on which most
people agree, and on which they judge political parties by their
competence in delivery. However, Stokes also observed that issues
vary in their salience – i.e. the degree to which they are uppermost
in voters’ minds – and it is salience that is decisive in determining
the political signiﬁcance of an issue (see also Page and Shapiro,
1983; Kingdon, 1995; Burstein, 2003; Hobolt and Klemmemsen,
2005).
Salience is commonly measured by the percentage of people
naming particular issues as ‘the most important’ or ‘another
important’ facing the country in tracker polls. On this measure,
there was a surge in public attention to climate change,
accompanied by a wave of media interest, during the middle of
the last decade and predating the campaign for the Climate Change
Bill (Fig. 1). This was indeed an important part of the context for
the adoption of the Climate Change Bill, and Juniper’s quote above
reﬂects this change in public mood. But even at the height of the
salience of climate change in 2006–07, voters were far more
concerned about other issues, such as crime, immigration and
health care (Fig. 2) (see also Carter, 2008: 198). Between 1997 and
2011, the percentage of people naming it as a priority concern rose
only twice, for relatively brief periods, into double ﬁgures.
The modestly higher salience of climate change in the mid-
2000s failed to transform the marginal role of environmental
issues in UK electoral politics (Carter, 2006, 2008, 2010). While 2%
of voters identiﬁed the environment as amongst the ﬁve most
important issues facing the country in the lead up to the 2005
election (Whiteley et al., 2005), that ﬁgure had increased to only 3%
in 2010 (Clarke et al., 2010). Party manifestos contained moreFig. 1. Salience of pollution/environment and newspaper coverage of global
warming/climate change.
Sources: Boykoff, M., Mansﬁeld, M. (2012; Ipsos MORI Issues Index (http://
www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/
poll.aspx?oItemID=56&view=wide)).environmental commitments in 2010 than in 2005 (Rootes and
Carter, 2010: 993), but contrary to Helm’s (2010) argument that
parties competed to ‘go green’, the election campaign itself,
including the televised leaders’ debates, was dominated by the
economic crisis and immigration. As Lockwood (2013: 19–20)
shows, there is also no evidence for claims (e.g. Helm, 2010: 186)
that small groups of electorally important voters give higher
salience to the environment.
Moreover, the salience of climate change soon declined with the
onset of the ﬁnancial crisis (Scruggs and Benegal, 2012); indeed
public interest followed the pattern of what Downs (1972)
identiﬁed as a ‘issue-attention cycle’, accompanied by related
media attention ‘frenzy’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The
salience of the environment in the UK was actually lower at the end
of 2011 than it was in 1997. As Patashnik (2008: 22–25) notes,
strategies used in pressing for the adoption of policy quickly reach
their limitations in the implementation phase, and this was indeed
the case for a campaign that was primarily based on drawing the
problem of climate change to peoples’ attention. Ironically,
the adoption of the Climate Change Bill in the autumn of 2006,
near the peak of the cycle, may itself have contributed to attention
moving on, since as Downs argued, once the public and media
think that a government has responded to an issue, their concern
and interest abates.
There are strong reasons for thinking that low salience will be
the norm for climate change as a public interest problem. While
frequently described as the greatest threat we face, climate change
is at the same time what Giddens (2009: 2) describes as a ‘‘back-of-
the-mind’’ issue, because ‘‘the dangers posed by global warming
aren’t tangible, immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day
life’’. Crucially, in this respect, climate change is different from the
localised air and water pollution problems which created an earlier
generation of environmental movements (Nordhaus and Shellen-
berger, 2007: 112–113). Unlike these previous forms of pollution,
greenhouse gases are invisible and odourless, and their worst
effects will largely be felt by future generations and in the
developing world. As a result, there is what Tony Blair called a
‘mismatch’ (Blair, 2004) between the environmental impact of the
problem on the one hand and its electoral impact on the other.
In contrast to the diffuse and long term potential beneﬁts of
climate policy, the possible costs, in the form of environmental
taxes and higher energy prices, are more immediate and tangible
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157; Lockwood, 2013: 21–23). In the period since the Climate
Change Act was passed, the political visibility of the cost of climate
policies in the energy sector passed through to consumers via
energy bills has increased, mainly due to hostile media coverage
and comment by opponents. Support for renewable energy, and in
particular wind power, has been particularly subject to criticism
(Powell, 2011; Moore, 2011; Moselle, 2011; Helm, 2012). At the
same time, while there is consistent evidence for high levels of
public support for renewable energy in general – of the order of
80% and above (e.g. DTI, 2006; Spence et al., 2010) – most people do
not feel sufﬁciently strongly to ignore the costs (a combination of
views that Humphrey (2009: 148) calls ‘‘simulative ecopolitics’’
and McLean (2008) calls ‘‘cheap talk environmentalism’’). Thus
Spence et al. (2010) ﬁnd 36% of respondents unwilling to pay
anything more for renewable electricity, and 88% unwilling to pay
more than £10 a month. Eurobarometer surveys provide similar
ﬁndings.
Within Patashnik’s framework, policy costs (whether perceived
or actual) can be seen as a negative mass policy feedback effect.
Against this, leaders of the main political parties and environmen-
tal lobbying groups (e.g. Green Alliance, 2012) have all attempted
to highlight the creation of new ‘low-carbon jobs’ as a form of
positive mass feedback effect, to shore up the popularity of climate
policy.
The effects of low carbon policies on employment are complex
to capture, involving both job creation and destruction (Sorrell and
Speirs, 2010; Fankhauser et al., 2008) and with no agreed
deﬁnitions are open to controversy (Morriss et al., 2009). Much
of the debate to date has focused on what Fankhauser et al. (2008)
call the ‘short-term effect’, i.e. jobs lost in directly affected (high
carbon) sectors and new jobs created in replacement industries,
since these are the most visible and obviously attributable effects.
The Government’s ofﬁcial estimate of employment in the low
carbon and renewable energy sub-sectors in 2010/11 was around
735,000, representing some 2.5% of total UK employment (BIS,
2012). Despite the wider economic downturn, job growth in these
sectors has been running at 6–7% per year.
However, the absolute number of low carbon jobs matters less
than their political effects, and there is as yet little evidence that
new job creation in low carbon and renewable energy sectors is a
speciﬁc major driver of wider public support for climate policy, or
indeed of the support of interest groups. In particular, the active
role played by manufacturing trade unions in Germany as part of
the coalitions that drove support policies for wind and solar energy
(Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Michaelowa, 2005) has not yet been
replicated in the UK, where the low carbon transition has also been
a relatively low priority for the Trades Union Congress.
The nature of climate change as an extreme type of public
interest problem, with diffuse and distant beneﬁts and more
immediate costs of policy, create what is known in economics (e.g.
Blackburn and Christensen, 1989) as a problem of ‘credible
commitment’; i.e. political leaders may give a commitment to
policy change, but if they have a political incentive to reverse that
policy because it is likely to become unpopular or undermines
other policy goals (here, for example, maintaining living standards
or competitiveness), then that commitment is seen as not credible,
Investors, in particular, fear the future reversal of policy and
themselves will not commit to assets speciﬁc to the new policy
regime. This problem of credible commitment lies at the heart of
public interest reform challenge (Patashnik, 2008: 5), including
climate policy (e.g. Helm et al., 2003).
If the political sustainability of climate policy is unlikely to be
underpinned by mass public support, at least in the short term,
Patashnik’s framework suggests that its sustainability will depend
heavily on other factors, especially institutional changes andvarious group policy feedback effects. It is to these factors that we
now turn.
4. Institutional transformation
The Climate Change Act’s most obvious institutional innovation
was the creation of the Committee on Climate Change. The idea of
an independent expert body setting policy has its roots in the
problem of credible commitment described above. One widely
adopted solution in monetary policy has been to delegate decision
making to an independent central bank, thereby ‘binding the
hands’ of government (Rogoff, 1985). In the UK this has taken the
form of the Monetary Policy Committee. A similar approach for
energy and climate policy was proposed before the adoption of the
Climate Change Bill (e.g. Helm et al., 2003), and promoted by David
Cameron (Cameron, 2007). However, those drafting the Act
rejected this model early on, believing that the range of policies
involved in the low carbon transition was too political to delegate
to a technical committee. Indeed, the long list of issues to which
the Climate Change Committee had to give consideration in
addition to climate science was included partly to give reassurance
to sceptics in the Treasury. Moreover, under the Act the
Committee’s recommendations to government for carbon budgets
are not legally binding and views differ on how far the Act might be
used as the basis for legal challenge if these were rejected.
McGregor et al. (2010: 43) conclude that the Committee is in fact
best viewed as a ‘Rolling Stern’ body that provides a constantly
updated analysis of the type that the Stern Review gave, and which
also incorporates an additional monitoring function, not so much
binding the hands of government as standing over it watching
carefully. This institutional arrangement is not without effect, but
it is weaker than straightforward delegation of powers (Helm,
2010: 193).
According to Patashnik (2008: 5, 164–5), sustained policy
change typically involves not just the creation of new institutions,
but also the dismantling of existing arrangements. However, the
relevant competitor to the Climate Change Committee in
recommending emissions reduction targets – the European
Commission – remains in place. UK unilateral targets and budgets
have to relate to European targets. The ﬁrst three carbon budgets
were already determined by the European target of reducing
emissions by 20% by 2020 from a 1990 baseline. The relationship
between budgets from 2023 onwards and future EU targets
remains unclear and controversial.
A second signiﬁcant institutional change that occurred in late
2008, not as a result of the Act but related to it, was the creation of a
new Department of Energy and Climate Change. Previously, the
lack of ownership of climate change targets in the Departments
required to actually deliver them (i.e. Business and Transport), had
been a real problem. At the time, a ‘senior government source’ was
quoted as saying that ‘‘the climate change bill imposes legally
binding carbon budgets on the whole of government – the
department responsible for managing them needs to be able to
deliver them’’ (Stratton, 2008). The new Department appeared to
be ﬁrmly established as part of the UK government landscape, but
over time some voices have emerged calling for it to be broken up
again (e.g. Nelson, 2012), and as a relatively small Department it
might be vulnerable under a future government. At the same time,
other institutions with policy making powers in relevant areas
have not been dismantled. The most important of these is the
Treasury, which retains decision making over taxation and subsidy,
including the Levy Control Framework for climate policies paid for
on energy bills (HM Treasury, 2011). Uncertainty over the
framework has had a major impact on investment in nuclear
and renewable technologies over the last two years (e.g. Wynn,
2012).
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A second key issue is how far the Climate Change Act has
reconﬁgured identities and incentives amongst different politically
important groups. Here I consider effects on three key groups:
environmental campaign groups, business and political parties.
Environmental campaign groups (especially Friend of the Earth)
played a central role as policy entrepreneurs (Hill, 2012: 168–172)
in the development of the Act. The most obvious – indeed,
intentional – effect of the Act has been to give such groups a new
legal tool in pressing for action on climate change, at least in
principle. However, it has not transformed the political power of
environmental campaign groups more fundamentally. As is a
common problem for policy entrepreneurs (Patashnik, 2008: 23),
environmental groups could not sustain a focus on the implemen-
tation of the Act, and as the public issue-attention cycle moved on
they also shifted to new campaigns. At the same time, the Act did
not lead to a large number of new supporters and members
ﬂooding in to the campaigning organisations. In fact all the major
environmental campaigning groups were affected by the economic
downturn, suffering a signiﬁcant drop in income. For example,
Friends of the Earth itself saw supporter income halved between
2007 and 2011. Environmental campaign groups, especially the
umbrella advocacy group Green Alliance, still remain an important
line of defence for the Act. However, the point is that such groups
still need to defend the Act (Allott, 2012); it has not so far produced
political momentum by swelling the ranks of the environmentalist
movement.
In the business community, there is a potential split between
those companies which saw opportunities in climate policy and
adapting their business models, and those more concerned about
the effects of climate policy on their costs and competitiveness
(Jeswani et al., 2008). The ﬁrst group has been cautiously active in
advocating for stronger climate policy. Those in the second camp
tend to be businesses in energy-intensive industries exposed to
international competition, such as iron and steel, and cement
(CCC, 2008: 371–72), as well as the large fossil fuel corporations.
Energy intensive companies have been an active lobby seeking
exemption from climate policy across the EU (Markussen and
Svendsen, 2005; Wettestad, 2008; Helm, 2010). The climate
change task force set up by the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI) in 2005 attempted to bridge these two groups. Largely
successfully, it aimed to get consensus on the recognition of
climate change and the importance of high level long term targets,
while also allowing room for disagreement on particular policies.
In this context the passage of the Climate Change Bill was
welcomed by the Confederation. The greater certainty that the Act
appeared to provide strengthened the hands of those in the
business community who saw emissions reduction as an
opportunity.
However, these effects have become weakened over time by
two factors. One is uncertainty about policy detail. The Act
provided some certainty on high-level targets and budgets, but
particular investments depend on the details of policies, and
heightened uncertainty at this level since 2011 has had a corrosive
effect (e.g. Vaughan, 2011). The second issue is concern about
competitiveness in the context of uncertainty about both
European-wide carbon targets beyond 2020 and the future of a
global climate deal. Energy intensive industries in particular have
expressed concerns about competitiveness (UK Steel, 2009: 16),
but these go wider and have been also been voiced by senior
Confederation representatives (e.g. Bentley, 2011). It is likely that
the potential effects of climate policy on the competitiveness on
UK business can be managed while they are still restricted to a
small group of industries, but if differentials in effective carbon
prices between the UK and the rest of the world continue to grow, alarger and larger proportion of the economy will be affected, and
the support of the business community would be at risk.
The weakening of policy feedback effects in the business
community matter, not least because they leave the Act more
vulnerable in the face of hostile groups. The most important of
these is the right wing of the Conservative party and its supporters
in the media. In the period since the Climate Change Act, there has
been a major shift in the party political context for climate policy.
As described in some depth by Carter (2006, 2008) and Rollinson
(2010), the mid-2000s were an unusual period of party political
consensus on climate policy, creating a competition effect in which
parties vied to appeal to the wave of concern and interest amongst
voters about climate change, described in Section 3 above. This
consensus was in large part the result of David Cameron’s adoption
of climate change as a strategy to ‘‘detoxify’’ the Conservative party
(Carter, 2010: 2–3).
However, even at the time, this strategy was not embraced by
all. As the Climate Change Bill was passing through Parliament, it
faced criticism from some backbench Conservative MPs (e.g. Peter
Lilley) and commentators on the right (e.g. Lea, 2008; Booker,
2008). A survey of Conservative MPs in July 2008 found that one
third were not convinced about man-made climate change (Carter,
2010: 7). Since the Act was passed, perceptions and identities have
become more not less entrenched and the Tory right appears to
have more power within the party. Hostile commentary on climate
policy has grown in the right-wing print media and on-line. Over
one hundred Conservative MPs wrote to the Prime Minister in
February 2012 calling for reductions in subsidies to wind power.
The breakdown in party consensus appears to have happened
for a number of reasons. First, by the time that the Act had passed,
it was beginning to become clear that the surge in the salience of
climate change as an issue, on which that consensus was largely
based, was already ebbing away. Indeed, by 2009, with the onset of
the ﬁnancial crisis, it seems likely that all the major political parties
– including Labour in government which was forging ahead with
the Low Carbon Transition Plan – were ahead of the public. The
mood seemed to be captured by the new intake of Conservative
party candidates in the 2010 general election. A survey of 141
prospective parliamentary candidates in January 2010 found that
they collectively ranked reducing Britain’s carbon footprint as the
lowest out of 19 policy priorities (Montgomerie, 2010). A second
reason is that the restraints on critics that were in place ahead of
the 2010 general election are now gone. Cameron’s detoxiﬁcation
strategy did not yield an outright majority, and at the same time
the rise of the right-wing populist and climate sceptic-led UK
Independence Party has strengthened the hands of Tory right, as
has the 2012 Cabinet reshufﬂe. Third, they have the support of the
Chancellor, who (under industry lobbying) appears to have
decided that gas must have a central role in UK energy policy
and that climate policy must not stand in the way of this. A fourth,
and probably the most important reason is that supporters of the
Act have not so far successfully challenged the way in which the
right has framed climate policy. Their critique resonates so deeply
with many potential Conservative voters not simply because
climate policy potentially incurs costs on households and British
industry, but also because it has been framed variously as a ‘‘green’’
tax, as ‘‘subsidies’’, as an unwarranted intervention by the state,
and sometimes as associated with Europe (see e.g. Shipman, 2011)
– all frames which connect with wider Conservative political
values. Supporters of climate policy have so far struggled to
reframe the issue (for example as one of job creation, innovation
and growth) with Conservative politicians and voters.
Carter (2010: 11) argues that even though the salience of
climate change has fallen away, the issue is likely to remain
politicised, because the position of the right wing of the
Conservatives provokes disagreement both within and between
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fact, not that most of the public agree with them on climate policy
(which they do not), but rather because of the low salience of
climate change. Even for Conservative voters, what they dislike,
according to focus groups, is not so much Cameron’s actual policy
positions but rather him ‘‘just going on about the environment all
the time’’ (cited in Carter, 2010: 8). As also discussed above, the low
salience of climate policy makes it vulnerable to cost critiques, a
fact that Conservative critics have utilised to the maximum. In
opposition, the Labour party has mirrored this set of political
signals. Its energy policy focus has been on prices rather than
carbon, and the shadow chancellor, Ed Balls, has been a strong
proponent of freezing fuel duty.
6. Investment effects
A ﬁnal characteristic of politically sustainable policy in
Patashnik’s framework is that it brings about substantial invest-
ments based on the expectations that reform will be maintained,
literally creating new vested interests which can act as a counter-
weight to interests that lose out in the post-reform economy. Here I
focus on the electricity sector, since it expected to be the lead
sector in decarbonisation and because it produces about 40% of
carbon emissions.
At the same time investor conﬁdence in the electricity sector is
particularly dependent on policies driven by long-term decarbo-
nisation targets. In theory, these policies include carbon pricing
through the European Union greenhouse-gas emissions trading
scheme. However, in practice, due to a mix of lobbying for
exemptions by energy-intensive industry (see above) and techni-
cal design problems (Laing et al., 2013), the carbon price signal
from the scheme has been too weak and volatile to drive signiﬁcant
low-carbon power sector investment. Instead, renewable support
mechanisms, and ad hoc measures, such as the proposed 2030
decarbonisation target for the sector, are seen as the main drivers
of conﬁdence.
The sector is still dominated by fossil fuel plants, representing
over three-quarters of electricity generating capacity in 2011
(DECC, 2012b, Table 5.7). However, existing assets give only a
partial view of vested interests, because older plants are largely
amortised. For potential effects arising from the Act, the trend in
new investments is also relevant. Table 1 shows new build in
capacity since 2006 and estimates of ﬁnancial investments by the
largest six generating companies (the ‘Big Six’) since the passage of
the Act. The Big Six have made major new investments in both
renewable electricity capacity (almost all wind) and thermal
(almost all gas-ﬁred) capacity since 2006. In terms of capacity, Big
Six investments in gas are actually larger than in renewables, but inTable 1
Estimates of recent electricity sector investments.
Gross build since 2006
(MW)
Gross investment since
CCA (£m)
Renewable Thermal Renewable Thermal
Centrica 410 895 500 260
E.On UK 651 1,417 815 450
EDF Energy 435 1,300 365 600
RWE npower 1,822 3,700 1,650 1,400
Scottish Power 1,490 0 1,200 0
SSE 1,732 826 2,000 50
Total Big Six 6,540 8,138 6,530 2,760
Others 6,000 1,300
Total 12,540 9,438
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2012).
Note: Investments include both new build and acquisitions.ﬁnancial terms, investment in renewables since 2008 has been
more than double that in gas.
Large scale investments in electricity generating plant have
long lead times. It is therefore also worth examining the forward
investment pipeline to assess the potential effects of the Act. In
theory, a large amount of new low carbon capacity should be built
over the next decade. A background study for the 2011 Renewables
Roadmap has projections of a ﬁve-fold growth in wind capacity
and an eight-fold growth in biomass by 2020 (AEA Technologies,
2010). The Government also hopes that a new generation of
nuclear plants will be built. But in practice, the broad picture is one
of an investment freeze for both renewables and nuclear.
According to the analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance in
April 2012, investment by the Big Six is due to fall off a cliff after
2012 (BNEF, 2012: 11). Uncertainty is being created by the
Electricity Market Review, the details of which have yet to be
ﬁnalised at the time of writing, but also by open conﬂict within the
coalition Government on the balance of incentives between gas
and renewables.
At the same time, the political effects of the investments made
to date are muted. About half the investment in low-carbon
generation capacity has been made by large companies, which still
hold mixed portfolios with a lot of high-carbon capacity. Upstream
electricity technology ﬁrms have explicitly lobbied for a 2030
decarbonisation target for the electricity sector, but the Big Six
have not. In a statement in the print media in December 2012 (The
Times 4 December 2012) by a large number of businesses and NGOs
calling on the Chancellor to agree to a binding decarbonisation
target for electricity, none of the large energy providers were
included. The other half of low carbon investment made since 2006
is in the hands of other smaller companies, but these do not form a
particularly uniﬁed and effective lobby. More widely, and partly
because of the split interests of the Big Six, renewable industry
associations are fragmented and splintered. Thus the Climate
Change Act has not yet produced an unambiguous vested interest
for carbon reduction in the electricity generation sector.
Finally, it is worth considering the almost 350,000 households
with solar PV systems, mostly installed since the introduction of
the feed-in tariff introduced in April 2010. Representing only
around 1.5% of households in the UK (a much lower number than in
Germany or Spain), the political impact of the emergence of mass
ownership of low carbon assets is hard to assess. On the one hand,
many small actors ﬁnd it harder to organise for collective action
and be an effective lobby group, and even collectively owners of
solar PV household systems have far less strategic power than large
power ﬁrms. On the other hand, those same householders may
have better political leverage than energy companies disliked by
politicians and the public alike.
7. Conclusions
In this paper I have aimed to provide a comprehensive and
systematic analysis of the forces working for and against the
political sustainability of the UK’s 2008 Climate Change Act. The
Act, along with related issues such as a 2030 decarbonisation target
for the electricity sector, is the subject of heated debate at the heart
of UK climate policy. To bring analytical structure and order to the
events since the passage of the Act, I have applied an approach for
understanding the politics of implementation of public interest
reforms originally developed in the US context by Patashnik (2003,
2008). Despite the fact that the political and institutional context in
the UK differs signiﬁcantly from that of the USA, Patashnik’s
framework can be usefully applied without amendment, as it uses
as its building blocks quite general concepts from political science.
Its utility here suggests that it might also be applied to explore
successes and failures in climate policy (or related areas such as
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tively. However, as discussed below, it does also have some limits,
especially in relation to the ideational reframing of policy.
The Act was an attempt to address a public interest policy
problem of an extreme nature, in which the beneﬁts of action are
highly diffused and distant in time, while costs are more
immediate. The campaigners for a Climate Change Bill (and to
some extent those in political parties) worked on the assumption
that there had been a permanent shift in the political salience of
climate change in the mid-2000s, and that the political future of
the Act would be assured through public pressure on political
leaders via Parliament. However, the evidence on the low salience
of climate change, and the relatively high salience of energy costs,
shows that this assumption was wrong.
In these circumstances, the political sustainability of the Act
depended heavily on institutional transformation and policy
feedback effects amongst politically important groups. The Act
has changed the institutional landscape, although this change has
its limits. The Committee on Climate Change is the most important
innovation, but it has inﬂuence based on reputation and authority
rather than formal powers. The creation of the Department for
Energy and Climate Change, while not actually part of the Act, has
been crucial for moving policy control over energy away from a
department mainly focused on competitiveness. Nevertheless,
the Department still remains constrained by the continuing
power of the Treasury, and may itself be vulnerable to future
restructuring.
The transformation of economic interests and political identi-
ties through feedback effects has been even less complete. To
create new vested interests, the Act needed to induce new low-
carbon physical and ﬁnancial investments, most immediately in
electricity generation. Here the picture is one of new investment in
a mix of conventional gas-ﬁred and new low-carbon capacity up to
2012, but then a stalling due to policy and political uncertainty.
The Act’s high level targets and budgets have not, on their own,
been enough to create major investment feedback effects so far.
In terms of identities and preferences, the passage of the Act did
help to strengthen the hand of those in the business community
who see the opportunities of a low carbon economy as out-
weighing the risks. However, the Act has not yet dispelled concerns
about the effects of unilateral action (as represented in the fourth
carbon budget and beyond) on competitiveness, and uncertainty
arising from party political disagreements. Support from business
matters because the strength of hostility from the right wing of the
Conservative party and associated commentators has not been
abated by the passage of the Act, indeed the opposite has
happened.
This failure to transform preferences and identities amongst
groups hostile to climate policy poses the greatest present danger
to the political sustainability of the Act. The basis of this hostility is
largely ideational, in that it is linked not only to doubt about the
scientiﬁc basis of anthropogenic climate change, but also
ideological opposition to taxation, state intervention and the
supranational powers of the European Union. Ensuring the
political sustainability of the Act rests crucially either in a decline
in the power of such groups, or in a discursive transformation of
climate policy, in which it becomes dissociated with these ideas
and credibly associated with other ideas that have more positive
connotations across the political spectrum. This dimension of
political sustainability points to what is probably the most
important limitation of Patashnik’s approach. His framework
(and the associated US case studies) draws largely on the rational
choice variant of political science, which emphasises the impor-
tance of institutions, and material and electoral interests in
politics, while at the same time having a thinner account of the role
of ideas.The overall conclusion of the analysis undertaken here is that,
in the absence to date of major shifts in group identities and
afﬁliations, and major low-carbon investments, the Climate
Change Act remains at risk of reversal. As Patashnik (2008: 32)
notes, this could come either in the form of a coalition ‘‘exerting
strong pressure to restore the status quo ante’’, or perhaps less
likely, politicians themselves leading a reversal. Although repeal
seems unlikely in the near future (despite calls for this by some),
the risk that the Act may be signiﬁcantly undermined over the
next few years remains very real. One of the protagonists
originally involved in the birth of the Act characterises it as ‘‘on
a knife edge’’.
This analysis of difﬁculties faced in securing the Act politically
should not be read as a statement of its ineffectiveness to date. It
was a major innovation, and in a sense, the ﬁerce debate in 2011
about adopting a stringent fourth carbon budget shows the worth
of the Act; it is quite likely that without a law with long term
targets and an institution like the Committee on Climate Change
standing behind it, a carbon budget for the 2020s would never have
been agreed to by the Government. The key question is whether
the Act can continue to play that role, given that its political future
is still uncertain.
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